Abstract-IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) has become the basis of fixed-mobile convergence for telecommunication operators. Compared to previous networks, IMS presents huge advantages, especially in terms of its ability to offer all types of services (voice and data). Nevertheless, with these advantages comes a whole new package of resilience (dependability & security) challenge, e.g., attacks, human mistakes, large scale disasters, etc. In this paper, we provide an overview on the state of research in the field of IMS resilience. We propose a two-dimensional tree-based taxonomy of IMS resilience challenges. This taxonomy considers unique features of IMS such as the layered architecture. We also classify the existing countermeasures into eight classes. We identify the resilience objectives of these countermeasures and analyze their applicability and efficiency on challenge families.
INTRODUCTION
IMS [1] was initially developed by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) for wireless access to convergent services. IMS has then evolved to comprise several access technologies, including both wireless and wired networks. It has thus become a key enabler for the convergence of fixed and mobile technologies.
Compared to previous telecommunication infrastructures, IMS presents huge advantages. These are mainly: easy development and deployment of new services, high level of quality of service (QoS), common billing and charging functionalities, etc.
Nevertheless, IMS architecture is based on IP, session initial protocol (SIP) and other Internet protocols (HTTP, SMTP, etc.). Therefore, it carries totally new resilience challenges (malicious attacks, accidental failures) for telecommunication operators, e.g., denial of service (DoS), unsolicited communications, fraud, eavesdropping, huge legitimate traffic, etc.
The 3GPP is aware of IMS vulnerabilities from the beginning. Therefore, several specifications [2, 3] have been provided to describe an IMS security architecture.
Nevertheless, the 3GPP specifications are too far from being complete. Only SIP signaling protection and mutual authentication techniques have been stated. No consideration is given to other aspects such as: media security, DoS, etc.
IMS resilience is still fragile and immature at the present. Challenges need a better identification with respect to specific IMS characteristics. A deeper understanding of the possible countermeasures is also required.
In our paper [4] , we have proposed a graphical model named CCT (Challenge Countermeasure Tree) for efficient identification of challenges and countermeasures. CCT is an extension to attack tree model that integrates countermeasures into its nodes.
In this paper, we provide an overview on the state of research in the field of IMS resilience. The purpose is to have a good level of knowledge about the challenges threatening IMS and the possible countermeasures for further construction of complete CCTs for IMS-based services.
For this purpose, we analyze and classify IMS challenges and countermeasures as follows:
We propose a two-dimensional tree-based taxonomy of IMS resilience challenges. Dimensions are aim and location. The first dimension reflects the impacted resilience attribute, i.e., availability, confidentiality, integrity, and accountability. The second dimension consisting of "location" is specific to IMS. It is composed of the trinomial: segment, layer, and element. We identify three segments in IMS network: (i) access segment between users and IMS; (ii) IMS core network; (iii) interworking zone between two IMS core networks belonging to two different operators. We also distinguish between the challenges that can appear in the two layers control and application of IMS. Finally, we aim to precise exactly which element in which layer of which segment is impacted by a challenge. Our taxonomy is based on a tree model to serve as the basis for further constructions of CCTs.
We also discern eight different classes of countermeasures. These are: (i) redundancy; (ii) failure detection; (iii) authentication schemes; (iv) protection against DoS; (v) intrusion detection and prevention systems; (vi) user privacy protection; (vii) confidentiality and integrity protection; (viii) virtualization. For each class, identify the resilience objectives, and analyze the applicability/efficiency on challenge families.
The rest of this paper is organized along these lines. In section II, we describe the IMS architecture. Section III provides some background on the meaning and principles of resilience, followed by the description of our resilience analysis model (CCT). In section IV, we study IMS resilience challenges. These challenges are first classified into ten families. We then detail the application to IMS of our two-dimensional tree-based model. Section V is dedicated to countermeasures. We study there the applicability/efficiency of existing countermeasures on challenge families. Some perspectives are drawn in the concluding section VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF IMS ARCHITECTURE
IMS is an overlay architecture on top of the IP network. It enables an easy deployment of new services, including video and data. The disadvantage of IP proximity is that IMS comes with a whole new package of security threats.
A. IMS Architecture
The architecture of IMS consists of four layers. Common functions and service enablers of each layer are mutualized by several applications. Functions and elements harmonization are fundamentally based on the SIP protocol [5] .
1) IMS Layers
The IMS architecture is composed of four layers: Access layer, which encompasses several types of access networks including UMTS, LTE, xDSL, etc.
Transport layer, consisting of the IP network. This includes routers and the transmission networks that link them together.
Control layer, representing the orchestrator that harmonizes various network elements in order to connect users to the requested services. It provides several functions such as: registration of end-points, routing of signaling messages, and overall coordination of media and signaling resources. These functions are performed by the most significant IMS network elements: Call Session Control Function and Home Subscriber Server database (see next section). The operator may use this layer to aggregate the services offered by himself or by third parties.
Application layer, composed of multiple application servers hosting value-added services.
2) IMS Elements IMS architectures differ from one vendor to another. We describe here the very principal elements of such architectures. These are: UE (User Equipment), Call Session Control Function (CSCF) and HSS (Home Subscriber Server).
UE refers to an application installed in the user terminal (e.g., PC, IP phone, UMTS mobile station, etc.) to send and receive SIP requests.
CSCF forms the central point of an IMS architecture. It processes and routes SIP messages for the purpose of session control. CSCF functions are divided into three main categories, creating the three entities of a CSCF: (i) Serving (S-CSCF) is the central node of the signaling plane; (ii) Proxy (P-CSCF) is the entry point for users to the IMS domain and services; (iii) Interrogating (I-CSCF) provides the entrance to the home domain when the user is visiting other networks.
HSS is a database similar to the HLR in GSM. It stores data about users such as: user's private and public identities, security information, registration state, S-CSCF serving the subscriber, user location, and user profile containing subscription-related information. HSS exchanges data with the CSCF using the Diameter protocol.
In addition to these elements, MGCF (Media Gateway Controller Function), SGW (Signaling Gateway) and MGW (Media Gateway) are the gateways that allow interworking between IMS and other networks. These components provide a certain level of conversion in data format, e.g., from ISUP to SIP, from TDM to IP and vice versa.
3) IMS Protocols
In order to connect IMS elements, several protocols are used. These are mainly IP protocols such as SIP for user session control and Diameter [6] for AAA (Authorization, Authentication and Accountability).
Other protocols such as Session Description Protocol (SDP) [7] and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [8] are exploited for media negotiation and transmission.
III. RESILIENCE ANALYSIS MODEL

A. Definitions
Resilience is one of those overloaded terms that change their meaning according to the context. It is deployed in multiple domains (psychology, ecology, economics, etc.).
In psychology, resilience is the ability of a person to cope with stress and adversity [9] .
In ecology, resilience has two meanings that must be distinguished. The first one is largely identical to stability (elasticity) property [10] . It consists of the time required for a system to return to a single equilibrium steady, or cyclic state, following a disturbance event [11] . The second meaning refers to moving from a stability state to another one under the influence of a certain amount of disturbances.
In [12] , the authors define organizational resilience as the ability to: (i) anticipate a perturbation before it happens; (ii) resist it by adapting when it occurs; (iii) recover by restoring the pre-perturbation state as much as possible. [13] defines resilience as the capacity to maintain or restore an acceptable level of functioning in face of perturbations or failures.
In telecommunications, resilience inherited its definition from computer systems, firstly to mean fault tolerance, dependability and survivability. In 2008, Laprie [14] defined resilience as the persistence of dependability when facing changes. The value added by Laprie was the act of "persisting with respect to anticipated and unanticipated changes" which means maintaining the property of dependability in face of challenges. In 2009, Meyer [15] added the notion of "persistence of performability" to the meaning of resilience. Cholda et al. [16] included QoS aspects in the description of resilience by defining the latter as an expanded concept of quality of service incorporating service availability and maintainability.
In [17] , the authors consider resilience as a multidisciplinary concept covering different areas such as: fault tolerance, survivability, disruption and traffic tolerance, dependability, performability, security, etc. They define it as "the ability to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in face of challenges and faults".
B. Challenge Countermeasure Tree (CCT)
In light of the foregoing, the main objectives of resilience, are : (i) to anticipate/avoid a perturbation before it happens; (ii) to cope, to absorb, and to adapt with disturbance; (iii) to return (bounce back) to normal operation.
We classify hence resilience mechanisms based on their objectives into:
Prevention means, aiming to reduce the probability of challenge occurrence.
Mitigation techniques, for reducing the impact of a challenge; mitigation encompasses two steps: detection to identify the presence of a challenge, and reaction to reduce its impact.
Recovery approaches, for returning the system to its normal operation. In order to assess the level of resilience, we define the "resilience attributes". These are qualities that can be assessed to determine the overall resilience. We consider the four following attributes:
Availability, the property of readiness of a service to be used; it encompasses maintainability (possibility of reparation) and reliability (service continuity).
Confidentiality, ensuring that only authorized subjects (persons, organizations, etc.) access the protected information.
Integrity, assuring that data is correct and can be trusted (authenticity and accuracy of data).
Accountability, the ability to tie actions to responsible users; non-repudiation function is a special case of accountability which ensures that all parties of a transaction cannot deny their authenticity.
In [4] , we propose a graphical model named CCT (Challenge Countermeasure Tree) for the design of resilient IMS-based services. This model represents an extension to the attack tree model that integrates countermeasures into its nodes.
The construction of a CCT starts with a simple attack tree (AT) for which the summit event is "Loss of X" ", where 'X' is the resilience attribute. Following the attributes sketched earlier, we consider four CCTs: "Loss of Availability", "Loss of Confidentiality", "Loss of Integrity", and "Loss of Accountability".
Once an AT (challenge part of CCT) is completed, we start building the countermeasure part of the tree. This part distinguishes between prevention, mitigation and recovery mechanisms (Fig. 1 ). This explicit differentiation provides a powerful decision-making support for the choice of the optimal set of countermeasures while designing resilient services.
In order to validate this model for IMS, we study the latter's resilience challenges and countermeasures. The challenges are classified, based on IMS' unique features. We also identify the existing countermeasures and specify their objectives, i.e. prevention, mitigation, and recovery. Finally, we provide a mapping between challenges and countermeasures. Figure 1 . A Challenge Countermeasure Tree [4] IV. CHALLENGE CLASSIFICATION
A. Background
The challenges threatening IMS have been investigated from several perspectives. In [18, 19] , the authors classify IMS elements into families (e.g., UE, database servers, application servers, control servers, gateways). They study then the most likely challenges to appear for each family. Similarly, works such as [20, 21, 22] explore the impact of security threats on IMS layers. In [2, 18] , an IMS network is divided into three segments: access between the UE and the P-CSCF, IMS core network and interworking part between two IMS networks. The security of each segment is studied apart. Multiple studies classify the threats according to their impact on security objectives [21, 23, 24] . Different definitions of security objectives have been given in each work. In [23] , the authors study IMS threats from two perspectives, considering providers' and users' concerns. [25, 24] deploy models such as TVRA, resp. ITU-T X.805, to identify IMS threats. A more detailed survey of IMS security threat taxonomies is provided in our paper [26] .
In this article, we exploit results from our former work to introduce a two-dimensional tree-based taxonomy of IMS resilience challenges. This taxonomy considers unique features of IMS such as the layered architecture and the distributed nature of the network.
The final objective of our research is the construction of challenge countermeasure trees (CCTs) for IMS challenges. We believe that the classification of IMS challenges using a tree model will be useful for further constructions of complete CCTs.
Before the proposal of our classification model, we first describe IMS challenges using the concept of challenge families ( § B). We then introduce the twodimensional tree-based model for challenge classification ( § C.1) and apply it to IMS ( §C.2).
B. Challenge Families
A challenge family regroups the threats that have the same nature/objectives. Hereafter, we describe ten challenge families. The first three families are accidental while the rest represent malicious attacks.
1) Human Mistakes & Incidents
Mistakes and accidents may occur during system design or in operation, e.g., equipment failure. Their effects might be minor and local in the luckiest situations, but they can also cause major and large scale damage.
2) Large Scale Disasters These events may be natural or caused by a human mistake which has a large-scale side effect. This kind of challenges affects large areas impacting huge numbers of users, e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.
3) Legitimate Traffic Overload
This category includes situations where a large surge of legitimate traffic is observed, e.g., a flash crowd. The latter is the result of an enormous amount of nonmalicious requests exceeding all provision and dimensioning efforts for a given service [27] .
4) Denial of Service
These attacks aim to prevent legitimate users from getting their services. We differentiate four categories of DoS attacks: flooding attacks, SIP parser attacks, session interruption, and information suppression.
Flooding attacks aim to saturate IMS resources by sending a massive amount of malicious requests in a short time. SIP parser attacks cause a denial of service if the parser is paralyzed. This includes: (i) malformed message attacks (e.g., messages with multiple values for the same header, extremely long messages, and usage of Non-UTF8 encoding characters in SIP message); (ii) sequence disordered message attacks (e.g., sending an ACK message following an Invite message before receiving the 200 OK response).
In session interruption attacks, the hacker exploits SIP vulnerabilities to end or paralyze an ongoing session. This encompasses: (i) SIP BYE and CANCEL attacks where an attacker sends forged BYE or Cancel message to teardown an established or establishing session; (ii) session modification using SIP Re-INVITE and UPDATE attacks to change session parameters in a way that prevents users from receiving correctly their media flows, e.g., changing the audio/video codecs contained in SDP body of Invite, 200 OK, and ACK messages.
Information suppression consists of deleting users' profiles from the HSS by insiders, or through external attacks, such as the activation of a malicious code.
5) Unsolicited Communication
On the Internet, unsolicited emails are known as 'spam'. They are mostly sent by marketers or fraudsters and are disturbing for users. In IMS, unsolicited communications [28] are likely to appear on several types of services, e.g., SPIT on voice calling, SPAM on emails, SPIM on instant messaging, etc. Moreover, unsolicited communications might be more serious with IMS since users can use one URI for several services, e.g., voice calls, email, and instant messaging. Spammers will then be able to disturb the user on more than one service using only one address.
6) Eavesdropping
These attacks rest in capturing and reading the data by unauthorized parties. They are performed on both signaling and media planes. Techniques such as: sniffing, scanning, traffic engineering and man-in-the-middle attacks are used for eavesdropping purposes.
7) Identity Usurpation
It consists of stealing user identity by a hacker. This could be performed by spoofing the IP address, spoofing the SIP/Tel URI, cracking the password in case a password-based authentication is deployed, e.g. SIP Digest.
8) Session Hijacking
This refers to the exploitation of a valid user session, e.g., by stealing the session ID (e.g., stealing an HTTP cookie). In IMS, this threat can be performed using SIP redirection attacks, P-CSCF impersonation, and registration hijacking.
SIP redirection -attackers sniff the traffic between the UE and the P-CSCF. When the UE sends an INVITE request, the attacker sends him back a fake 3xx response in order to redirect the traffic toward a manipulated machine [21] . The Contact header of the 3xx response is used to indicate the forged destination address.
P-CSCF impersonation (P-CSCF discovery attack) -attackers break the process of P-CSCF discovery to make the UE think that it is communicating with the right P-CSCF when, in reality, the contact is done with attacker's equipment. Several methods are possible to perform this attack, e.g., DNS poisoning where the P-CSCF IP address is faked, redirection using SIP 3xx messages towards the wrong P-CSCF, UE configuration tampering to modify connection parameters, etc.
Registration hijacking -the attacker performing a man-in-the-middle attack captures Register messages sent by the UE, changes the "Via" and "Contact" headers to its own addresses, and forwards the messages to the P-CSCF. A 401 challenge will then be sent to the attacker who changes back the "Via" and "Contact" headers and forwards the message to the UE. The latter sends a second REGISTER containing the answer to the authentication challenge. Again, the attacker changes "Via" and "Contact" headers to its own addresses and routes the message to the P-CSCF. By the end, the attacker will succeed to register its own IP address combined with the UE IMPU to the IMS.
9) Message Tampering
This class of attacks consists of changing the message content by an unauthorized party. It includes SIP and RTP injections and malicious code injection (e.g., SQL injection).
10) Service Theft
The aim of this attack is to exploit paying services for free (or at least cheaper than they should be). Two techniques are possible: the first one consists of unauthorized access to user services. The second one refers to toll fraud attacks. Unauthorized access can be performed by stealing a legitimate identity (i.e., identity usurpation) or hijacking a legitimate session (i.e., session hijacking).
Toll fraud is a threat that breaks the provider's ability of charging users on their service exploitation correctly. Toll fraud attacks are generally performed by bypassing IMS or the P-CSCF. IMS bypass consists of an attack where two communicating users: (i) get each other's IP address from the exchanged SIP messages during session establishing phase; (ii) send a SIP Bye message toward IMS to end the session and thus the charging operation; (iii) continue their communication in a peer to peer way without being charged.
C. Two-Dimensional Tree-Based Taxonomy
In this section, we propose a customized classification of IMS challenges. In sub-section 1, we describe this approach, followed by its application on IMS in subsection 2.
1) Proposal
A two-dimensional tree-based taxonomy is introduced: the first dimension is related to resilience, while the second one is specific to IMS. This taxonomy takes the form of a tree for further constructions of more complete attack trees/CCTs. Dimensions
We consider two dimensions, aim and locations, as described below:
Challenge aim reflects the affected resilience attribute(s). A stated earlier, four attributes are taken into consideration: availability, confidentiality, integrity and accountability. Table I provides the mapping of IMS challenge families with their impacted resilience attributes.
Challenge location indicates the position where a threat may appear. IMS network can be divided into three segments: (i) access segment between users and IMS; (ii) IMS core network itself; (iii) interworking zone between two IMS core networks belonging to two different operators. Challenges can thus be located according to the segment of appearance. On the other hand, IMS architecture is based on two principal layers on top of the access and network layers. These are the control and application layers. Challenges can also be located according to the manifestation layer. Finally, challenge location can indicate directly the element where it appears. In our work, we consider the location as a trinomial composed of the element (1) in a layer (2) of a segment (3) that has been (or could be) impacted by the challenge. This combined view provides deeper information on challenges' location and movements. Tree model As mentioned before, our taxonomy is based on the format of a tree for further constructions of complete attack trees named CCTs [4] . We use two dimensions, aim and location, to build our tree as described below.
The aim is to distinguish four trees for which the top event is "Loss of 'X'", X being a resilience attribute, i.e., availability, confidentiality, integrity, accountability. Consequently, four classes of challenges will be represented by trees with the following top events: loss of availability, loss of confidentiality, loss of integrity, and loss of accountability (Fig. 2) . Location is introduced into each tree by dividing the top event into three sub-classes corresponding to the segments: access, core network, and the interworking zone. Similarly, we divide each segment into the two layers control and application. We then continue developing down the tree using the potential challenge families until arriving to the level element (if possible). Fig. 3 shows the general structure of our model. 
11) Application to IMS Challenges
For simplification purposes, we have not represented "large-scale disasters" and "human mistakes and incidents" in the graphical representation of challenges.
The reason is that these challenges can appear at each segment/layer/element.
In the following, we are going to describe IMS challenges after the application of the two-dimensional tree-based taxonomy. Results are shown in the trees: Loss of availability (Fig. 5) , Loss of confidentiality (Fig. 6) , Loss of integrity (Fig. 7) , and Loss of accountability (Fig.  8) .
Loss of availability (Fig. 5) The challenges that influence availability are legitimate traffic overload, DoS, unsolicited communication, and session hijacking.
We have noticed that malicious flooding attacks and legitimate traffic overloads have the same impacts on IMS despites the fact that their origins are completely different (malicious vs. legitimate users). We have thus regrouped these two challenges under the same family named "flooding challenges".
Unsolicited communication is an end to end problem where spammers disturb the user on more than one service. Therefore, we mention this challenge in the tree without placing it in any segment.
On the access segment, both DoS and session hijacking problems have been identified as challenges causing loss of availability. These include mainly the P-CSCF discovery attacks on the control layer and UE misconfiguration on the application layer. UE misconfiguration can lead to DoS attacks if attackers succeed to distribute botnets over users' devices. It also can lead to a session hijacking problem if attackers forge the IP address of the P-CSCF in the UE configuration.
On the core network, DoS challenges on the control layer encompass: (i) flooding challenges; (ii) session interruption attacks; (iii) SIP parser attacks. On the application layer, DoS challenges include: (i) flooding challenges (RTP flooding on gateways/ASes, HTTP flooding on ASes, flash crowd on ASes); (ii) information suppression on the HSS (by insider or through the activation of malicious code); (iii) misconfiguration of IMS elements by insiders/externals.
In interworking zone, the main hazards on the control layer are: (i) DoS attacks performed by SIP flooding attacks on the I-CSCF (the entry point to the home network when user is connected to a visited network) -this attack is even more dangerous if the attacker controls the resources of the visited network; (ii) session hijacking by impersonating the home I-CSCF in order to prevent the final user from reaching his home network. On the application layer, the main challenges are RTP/HTTP flooding attacks on the home network. These attacks are performed by a hacker that controls the resources of the visited network.
Loss of confidentiality (Fig. 6 ) The potential challenge families threatening confidentiality are: eavesdropping, session hijacking, and identity usurpation.
On the access segment, the main challenges on control layer are: (i) eavesdropping through signaling sniffing; (ii) session hijacking through SIP redirection attacks, P-CSCF discovery attacks, and registration hijacking; (iii) identity usurpation using IP and SIP URI spoofing attacks in SIP messages. On the application layer, the potential challenges are: (i) eavesdropping using media sniffing techniques; (ii) identity usurpation using password cracking.
On the core network, loss of confidentiality in the control layer can be the result of an eavesdropping through the activation of malicious code on elements where the majority of signaling traffic transits, e.g., P-CSCF, signaling gateways. The eavesdropping can also be performed by a scan aiming to discover the topology of IMS network. Another way to break confidentiality is session hijacking using a SIP redirection attack on the signaling gateway. On the application layer, confidentiality can be broken by: (i) eavesdropping through information theft from the HSS by insiders, or by activating malicious codes on the HSS or on the application servers (ASes); (ii) session hijacking through phishing attacks with Web-based services.
Interworking zone communication confidentiality is threatened on the control layer by: (i) eavesdropping using signaling sniffing techniques; (ii) session hijacking using SIP redirection attacks and home I-CSCF impersonation; (iii) identity usurpation using visited P-CSCF IP address spoofing. On the application layer, confidentiality is threatened by eavesdropping challenges through media sniffing.
Loss of integrity (Fig. 7) The challenges that might threaten integrity consist of data tampering, session hijacking and identity usurpation. Session hijacking effects integrity if the attacker changes the messages transiting through him (e.g. man in the middle attack). Identity usurpation impacts integrity because an unauthorized entity connects to the network and sends its forged requests.
On the access segment, the potential challenges on the control layer are: (i) data tampering using SIP SQL injections on the SIP messages transiting between the UE and the P-CSCF; (ii) session hijacking through SIP redirection attacks, P-CSCF discovery attacks, and registration hijacking; (iii) identity usurpation using IP and SIP URI spoofing attacks in SIP messages. On the application layer, the potential challenges are (i) data tampering using RTP and HTTP injection techniques; (ii) identity usurpation using password cracking.
On the core network, loss of integrity in the control layer is based on data tampering using malicious code injections on signaling gateways (such as SQL code injection). In the application layer, data tampering is based on: (ii) malicious data destruction by insider on the HSS; (iii) RTP injection in media gateways (MGW).
In interworking zone, the main hazards on the control layer are: (i) data tampering using SIP SQL injections on SIP messages transiting between the visited and home networks; (ii) session hijacking through SIP redirection attacks, and home I-CSCF impersonation. On the application layer, the main challenges are RTP/HTTP injections in media flows transiting between the visited and home networks.
Loss of accountability (Fig. 8) The challenges that threaten accountability are: (i) session hijacking; (ii) identity usurpation; which allows the attacker to abuse a legitimate user services (unauthorized access); (iii) toll fraud that breaks the provider's ability of charging properly users on their service exploitation.
Concerning the access segment, the potential challenges on the control layer are: (i) session hijacking through SIP redirection attacks, P-CSCF discovery attacks, and registration hijacking; (ii) identity usurpation using IP and SIP URI spoofing attacks in SIP messages. On the application layer, the potential challenge is identity usurpation using password cracking.
On the core network, accountability is threatened by toll fraud using P-CSCF bypass and IMS bypass.
In interworking zone, the main hazards on the control layer are: (i) session hijacking through SIP redirection attacks, and home I-CSCF impersonation; (ii) identity usurpation by spoofing the visited P-CSCF. On the application layer, the main challenges threatening the accountability consist of malicious neglect of SLA by the visited network provider.
V. COUNTERMEASURES CLASSIFICATION
A. Background
As 3GPP is aware of IMS vulnerabilities from the beginning, several specifications [2, 3] were provided to describe IMS security architecture. This architecture is composed of two parts: access and network domain security. Access security comprises: (i) SIP signaling protection between the subscriber and IMS using IPsec [29] for data confidentiality/integrity/origin authenticity; (ii) mutual authentication between subscribers and IMS using AKA [30] . Network domain security is enforced using security gateways, topology hiding techniques and IPsec for data encryption or integrity verification.
Five security associations have been stated as clarified in Fig. 4 . Association 1 provides mutual authentication between the UE and IMS. Association 2 protects the communication between the UE and the P-CSCF. Association 3 secures the messages transported between the HSS and the CSCFs. Association 4 is setup if the P-CSCF is located in a visited network. It protects the messages that transit between SIP capable elements in two different IMS core networks. Association 5 covers the communications between SIP capable nodes internally in IMS core network.
Nevertheless, this architecture is limited to authentication and SIP signaling protection mechanisms. No consideration is given to other problems such as: denial of service, user privacy, media security, etc.
There are many works delivering countermeasures for specific problems such as denial of service or media security. However, few works perform critical analysis of the existing countermeasures. In [31] , the authors compare authentication mechanisms such as SIP digest, IMS AKA and SIP with TLS. [32, 33] analyzes cryptography methods for media security, e.g., ZRTP, SRTP, etc.
At the moment of writing, no work -that we are aware of -provides an overview of existing countermeasures. In this paper, we are going to investigate and categorize such countermeasures ( §B). We will also consider the applicability/efficiency of these countermeasures on challenge families ( §C). 
B. Countermeasure Classes
In order to identify existing countermeasures, we have investigated several works including: 3GPP specifications, papers describing countermeasures of specific problems (e.g., DoS) or related to a certain protocol (e.g., SIP). We have identified eight families. These are, as described below: (i) redundancy; (ii) failure detection; (iii) authentication schemes along with signaling confidentiality and integrity methods; (iv) protection against DoS; (v) intrusion detection and prevention systems; (vi) user privacy protection; (vii) confidentiality and integrity protection; (viii) virtualization.
1) Redundancy
As usual, hardware and software redundancy are vital resilience mechanisms to avoid/reduce IMS unavailability and single point of failure problems. Two types of such technique can be deployed: (i) local redundancy -for the core IMS, diverse approaches might be used, e.g., active/standby, active/active, N+K [34] ; geographical redundancy -it can be achieved using different subsolutions such as stateless geo-redundancy, double provisioning, automatic data replication, and IMS restoration depending on the type of node.
2) Failure Detection Several means are used to detect failures as soon as possible in order to enable an automatic failover to replicates. These means exist at all levels, e.g., at SIP interfaces (SIP timer, ICMP expiration, ping, …), Diameter interface (watchdog mechanisms), DNS/ENUM (timeouts).
3) Authentication Schemes
Mutual authentication is one of the principal security mechanisms in IMS security specifications [2, 35] . Authentication takes place during user registration. The main authentication schemes are: SIP Digest, IMS Authentication & Key Agreement (IMS AKA) with the IPSec, and TLS with SIP Digest [2] . TLS and IMS AKA offer confidentiality and integrity capabilities. SIP Digest Figure 5 . Loss of availability tree Figure 6 . Loss of confidentiality tree SIP Digest is deployed for authentication in IMS when the UE lacks ISIM/USIM interfaces. It consists of a password-based challenge response authentication protocol. After receiving the first register message, the S-CSCF sends a "401 unauthorized response" which contains the authentication challenge. The UE calculates its response and returns it back to the S-CSCF. The latter checks the correctness of the answer and sends back a 200 OK response to the UE.
IMS AKA IMS AKA represents the strongest authentication scheme that can be deployed with IMS [2] . Nevertheless, currently, not all terminals support the ISIM/USIM interfaces which are necessary to accomplish this authentication. The authentication procedure is quite similar to SIP Digest, except for the establishment of a security tunnel that protects communication confidentiality and integrity between the UE and the P-CSCF. TLS TLS can be deployed with SIP Digest in order to implement integrity and confidentiality functions. When the UE receives the 401 response, it initiates the handshake procedure required for TLS. In this scenario, IMS is authenticated through the usage of valid certificates. The UE sends then the second REGISTER message encrypted to the CSCF (using a TLS security tunnel established after the handshake procedure). All traffic following the second REGISTER message is encrypted, and integrity is checked. 
4) Protection against DoS
No considerations have been given to DoS attacks in the 3GPP specifications. Nevertheless, numerous works propose countermeasures for these challenges because of their danger.
In [36] , Rebahi et al. focus on DoS attacks against the P-CSCF. These attacks are mainly SIP flooding. The authors propose the usage cumulative sum algorithm (CUMSUM) to detect quickly any "suspicious" change in the IMS traffic. CUMSUM is an algorithm used in data mining to detect a point of change in a statistical distribution between two hypotheses. Within IMS, SIP traffic transiting through the P-CSCF is observed during a period of time which is divided into several time intervals with the same duration. The observed SIP methods change depending on the case study (e.g., INVITE in case of INVITE flooding attack). The change point is detected by comparing the traffic behavior in the different time intervals using a mathematical formula. Results show that the cumulative sum algorithm is very fast and highly accurate for constant rate and increasing rate attacks detection.
[37] deploys the Hellinger distance algorithm to detect the flooding attacks against VOIP protocols in both the transport and application layers (TCP, SIP, and RTP). Hellinger distance is used to quantify the difference between two probability measures in order to detect traffic abnormality.
[38] conducts a comparative study on anomaly detection algorithms that aim to detect flooding attacks in IMS. These algorithms are: adaptive threshold, cumulative sum, and Hellinger distance. Adaptive threshold is an algorithm where the moving average of a given feature is calculated in a predefined time-window. The feature chosen for the adaptive threshold and CUMSUM algorithms is the number of arrived INVITE requests in a time-window. For Hellinger distance, the frequency of INVITE, 200 OK, ACK and BYE messages arrived in a pre-defined time-window is calculated in two phases: "training phase" and "test phase". Hellinger distance is then calculated between the two phases. The experimentation computes the accuracy of these algorithms by comparing the detection of false alarms, and changing the attacks intensity. Both harmonic and chunk attacks are used. Results show that for adaptive threshold and Hellinger distance algorithms, the detection of high intensity attacks is better compared with low intensity attacks, contrary to cumulative sum which shows surprisingly better performance with low intensity attacks. Adaptive threshold and cumulative sum performances are much better with harmonic attacks comparing with chunk attacks. Hellinger distance algorithm seems to show the best performances after the combination of harmonic and chunk attacks.
In [39] , Geneiatakis et al. detect SIP flooding attacks using counting bloom filters [40] to record SIP session states (open, in progress, established). They also use a metric named "session distance" to correlate the number of received "INVITE" requests with the number of 200 OK responses and ACKs: this metric reflects the number of pending sessions. Based on profiling, the authors calculate the normal number of pending sessions for a given system. Using session distance metric, it is possible then to detect deviation from normal operation.
[41] compares a set of evolutionary and nonevolutionary machine learning algorithms for SIP-based DoS attacks detection in IMS. The comparison is based on a set of metrics including true positive rate, false positive rate, training time and testing time. The authors conclude that there is no specific algorithm which is best for all scenarios. Nevertheless, the best suited algorithm is specified for each scenario.
In [42] , Chen and Itoh propose the usage of a whitelist of legitimate SIP users to prevent DoS attacks from happening. The authors assume that the construction of a whitelist should be easy with SIP because users update their registration every now and then. Each line of this whitelist contains at least four parameters: UID, IP address, timestamp of last registration and expiry time in seconds. Results show that this approach is efficient with weak authentication, schemes but has no impact on the attacks that has the capability to bypass strong authentication methods.
In [43] , SIP-based DoS attacks have been classified into SIP message flow tampering, SIP message payload tampering and flooding attacks. The authors study the countermeasures considering algorithm and framework related aspects. They conclude that for two categories of SIP-based DoS attacks, which are the message payload tampering and message flow tampering, existing solutions are more or less sufficient. Payload attacks can be resolved using correct and fail-resistant SIP parser implementations. This solution can be strengthened if it is combined with signature-based detection for known attacks and anomaly-based prevention systems for unknown ones. For message flow tampering, several works [44, 45] propose the usage of cross-protocol solutions which seem to have a lot of shortcomings. The authors suggest the deployment of encryption techniques to prevent these attacks. However, many end user terminals still suffer from a poor SIP implementation. Therefore, encryption methods remain optional. According to the authors, the biggest unsolved concerns consist of SIP flooding attacks. Some promising approaches such as change point detection algorithms and single source flooding protection mechanisms have been presented in several works. Nevertheless, few steps have been taken in order to mitigate these attacks. The authors are also looking forward for works that deploy the studied solutions on real networks. So far, the majority of proposed solutions has not been implemented, or was only evaluated using simulations.
5) Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
In [46] , the authors define a signature-based intrusion detection system to perceive the malformed messages. Signature definition is based on RFC 3261 [5] where the syntax of well-formed SIP messages has been stated. After comparison with the signatures, all non-compliant messages are discarded. The authors notice that the rules specified in the RFC 3261 do not cover all types of malformed SIP messages. Many other works (e.g., [47] , [48] ) extend the rules of RFC3261 to cover more malformed messages.
Seo et al. propose a stateful intrusion detection system to detect SIP malformed messages and flooding attacks [47] . Detection is achieved using rule matching algorithm and state transition models. Rules are specified to match attacks and misbehaviors based on the content of communications and the state of SIP session and proxies.
[48] presents a rule-based intrusion detection and prevention system. SIP headers are classified into mandatory, optional and non-allowed. An abstract data model is then constructed. The authors notice some flaws in RFC 3261 and provide new rules to cover these shortcomings.
In [49] , Farooqi and Munir implement an IDS in the P-CSCF of IMS core network. The IDS is based on Knearest neighbor (KNN) classifier for anomaly detection. KNN is one of the simplest machine learning algorithms. An object is voted by its K-nearest neighbors and is assigned to the class of the majority of its K-nearest neighbors. Results show that the KNN provides high detection rate for intrusive attacks with low false positives.
Several researches propose the usage of machine learning algorithms to detect novel and unknown anomalous SIP messages. In [50] , the authors improve their learning technique using a self-learning component. The principle consists of re-training the anomaly detector periodically using the traffic that has been already flagged as normal. For security reasons, random samples are chosen for re-training. Sanitization techniques and verification by comparison with the last training sample are also deployed. The results show a 99% detection rate with no false positives. [51] compares between four types of learning machines: C4.5, RIPPER, NB and C-SVM. The authors sniff real world SIP traffic by placing a SIP logger at the P-CSCF of an operational IMS service provider during 30 days. The results show that C4.5 provides the best detection accuracy of 0.99 followed by RIPPE which gives a detection accuracy of 0.98. On the other hand, NB and C-SVM offer relatively low accuracies of 0.94 and 0.81, respectively. Sengar et al. propose an intrusion detection system that deploys finite state machines to model the behavior of communicating SIP nodes [45] . This model allows the detection of anomalous behaviors and attacks. The authors evaluate the performance of their system and the overhead it costs. The results show that for known attacks, the IDS provides high accuracy with low false positives. However, with unknown attacks, detection accuracy depends on the state machines fidelity. Niccolini et al. implement an intrusion detection/prevention system (IDPS) that uses both knowledge and behavior-based detectors [52] . The IDPS is implemented as an extension to SNORT, the wellknown signature-based network IDS.
SCIDIVE is another stateful intrusion detection system for VoIP environments [44] . SCIDIVE takes into account both signaling and media traffic (SIP and RTP). It is thus capable to correlate cross-protocol behaviors. This provides higher detection rate for complex attacks. Nevertheless, SCIDIVE is rule-based. This makes it less effective for unknown attacks detection. SCIDIVE must be deployed somewhere where both SIP and RTP traffic circulate. Therefore, the authors chose to place the IDS in front of all relevant users.
SIP SQL injection is a message tampering attack that attempts to modify, in an unauthorized way, information stored in the HSS and causes a denial of service. In [53] , the authors propose a detection framework based on signatures to detect SIP SQL injections. They define a set of restrictions in order to defend against these attacks. These consist mainly of: (i) limitation of the authorization header length; (ii) definition of SQL keywords (e.g., INSEST, UPDATE, DELETE, etc.) that should not appear in SIP messages.
6) User Privacy
Besides data confidentiality, there are few works on user privacy. These works mostly deal with identity anonymity and protection of the user location information.
RFC 3323 [54] provides some privacy mechanisms for SIP messages. This RFC focuses on obscuring user identity in untrusted domains with methods such as (i) using anonymous values for certain SIP headers (e.g., From), (ii) removing critical headers (e.g., P-assertedIdentity and Via) to prevent identity revelation.
In [55] , Kong et al. propose a lightweight scheme to protect user location information from tampering. The addressed threats exploit the vulnerabilities of location functionalities in SIP for impersonation (redirection to malicious address) and denial of service (dropping a request because of localization problems). In this work, users generate temporary public keys that are bound with their identity and location information during the registration process. To verify the location information on other domains, the public keys are transported using secure channels between the different domains. The experimental evaluation shows that the proposed scheme has the same performance as unsecured SIP and it is 3 to 50 times faster than SIPS.
The authors introduce in [56] a solution to protect the caller identity using public key cryptography. User identity is transported encrypted. The home proxy is the only entity that has the capability to recover user identity. In this work, TLS (and other hop-to-hop encryption solutions) are not trusted for the protection of user anonymity. It is considered that the caller will never be sure that all intermediate nodes deploy TLS (or other hop-to-hop solutions).
7) Confidentiality and Integrity Protection
This includes signaling protection, topology hiding, and media protection. Signaling protection is enforced using IPsec or TLS as described with the authentication schemes. Topology hiding and media protection are presented below.
Topology hiding This mechanism was stated by the 3GPP. It consists of concealing the capabilities of IMS core network, e.g., hiding the number and operating systems of the S-CSCFs. I-CSCF and IBCF are responsible for this operation. These elements encrypt the S-CSCF address in SIP Via, Record-Route, Route and Path headers in the outgoing SIP messages and decrypt these addresses from the incoming messages.
Media protection Media plan security is investigated by both IETF and 3GPP. 3GPP has issued a technical report TR 33.828 [57] discussing the security requirements at the media plan. So far, the proposed solutions by IETF and 3GPP for media security are quite similar. These encompass (i) cryptographic protocols/algorithms for media encryption such as SRTP and SRTCP that provide confidentiality and message authentication, DTLS which offers confidentiality and integrity protection without affecting network performance [58] , and DTLS-SRTP that unifies the advantages of the two protocols [59] ; (ii) key management systems for cryptographic keys exchange between IMS elements, e.g., MIKEY [60] , MIKEY-IBAKE [57] , TBS [57] , SDES [61] , etc.
8) Virtualization
Virtualization consists of decoupling software application from hardware. This technology enables the encapsulation of applications and their respective OS in virtual machines (VM).
Live migration is one of the most important features of this technology. It consists of migrating VM instances between physical hosts without interrupting the running services.
Live migration can then be the solution to reduce overload problems that affect IMS elements such as the CSCFs. This makes virtualization a powerful resilience mechanism that guarantees high availability with service continuity. However, few works treat the virtualization aspects in IMS. In [62] , the authors describe a solution for IMS virtualization and show how migration reduces the delays by 40% for registration and by 38% for session setup. MR/R MR/R MD MD P MR P MD MD P P MR P MD P P P P/MR P/MR p p p P P P P MD P P P P P P P P MD P P P MD P P P: Prevention, MD: Mitigation-Detection, MR: Mitigation-Reaction, R: Recovery highly efficient; partially efficient; efficient with external challenges
C. Analysis
We examine in this section the applicability and efficiency of the countermeasure classes on IMS challenge families. For each class, we identify the resilience objectives (i.e., prevention, mitigation, recovery). Table II . summarizes the results of this work. We use different colors to indicate the efficiency of a countermeasure with a given challenge family. Green designates high efficiency; yellow means that the countermeasure is efficient with external attackers, but doesn't make any difference with internal malicious users; red shows that the countermeasure reduces partially the risk of a given challenge. It is noteworthy that the majority of existing countermeasures are preventive mechanisms.
1) Redundancy
Redundancy techniques reduce the impact of certain challenges such incident & human mistakes and largescale disasters.
In case an accident occurs for one of the replicates, the others take over its functions. If the replicates have enough capacity to mask the problem to the end user, we consider that redundancy allows the recovery of normal operation.
Similarly, with large-scale disasters, redundancy might be a mitigation/recovery solution if the replicates are not all affected by the disaster.
Redundancy is also a very efficient mitigation solution for overload problems, including the legitimate or malicious (flooding attacks) ones.
9) Failure Detection
The impact of challenges such as human mistakes & incidents and large-scale disasters can be partially reduced using failure detection techniques if these allow an early dysfunction detection.
10) Authentication Schemes SIP Digest offers a one way authentication scheme and protects against replay attacks. Nevertheless, it lacks confidentiality and integrity protections. It is also vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks because messages are communicated in plaintext. Additionally, SIP Digest is a password-based authentication method which: (i) needs a pre-established trust environment for password distribution; (ii) is vulnerable to brute force attacks aiming to guess the password; (iii) doesn't present any correlation between password and user identity (SIP URI), which makes identity usurpation and impersonation attacks more likely. In light of the foregoing, SIP Digest is considered to be inadequate to secure the communication between the UE and the P-CSCF [31, 53] .
On the other hand, authentication schemes with signaling confidentiality and integrity (IPsec and TLS) are more appropriate to cover confidentiality, integrity and origin authentication requirements. They are preventive measures aiming to avoid: (i) unauthorized access from the access/interworking segments to the IMS core network; (ii) modifications of the SIP messages transiting between IMS and the external world. This includes the threats where attackers intend to modify/eavesdrop SIP messages or session parameters, e.g., DoS attacks using session interruption techniques, eavesdropping on SIP messages, password cracking using traffic analysis methods, redirection attacks, P-CSCF impersonation, registration attacks, SQL injection. Some of these attacks can be performed by an internal legitimate user who has malicious intentions, e.g. SQL injection. In this case, the authentication schemes are useless. The probability of appearance of other challenges such as flooding attacks and parser attacks are partially reduced using these countermeasures.
The usage of IPsec requires pre-established trust relationship between communicating parties. Moreover, the early IMS terminals do not support U(niversal)SIM/ISIM (IM Services Identity Module) interfaces. Consequently, IPsec and AKA deployment is currently impossible.
Unlike IPsec, TLS does not assume any trust relationship between communicating parties. Nevertheless, TLS suffers of his own flaws such as its inability to run over UDP -it only runs over TCP. Keeping several TCP connection up might be very heavy for the SIP proxy servers.
11) Protection Against DoS
DoS protection techniques guard the IMS core network resources from being saturated or paralyzed. Some of these countermeasures are preventive, e.g., whitelists and machine learning systems. Others, such as change point detection algorithms and intrusion detection systems, provide the first mitigation step, i.e., detection. We notice that the focus is on detection mechanisms. Few works propose methods to prevent DoS appearance. Moreover, the mitigation is incomplete because most studies are limited to the detection step without suggesting any reaction.
Whitelists prevent outsiders from sending SIP requests to IMS. Nevertheless, they are unable to protect IMS from the attacks performed by internal malicious users, or attackers who were able to register into IMS (e.g., using registration hijacking).
Machine learning and intrusion systems are efficient for the prevention/detection of parser attacks.
Encryption might prevent attackers from providing session interruption attacks (e.g., forged BYE, CANCEL, Re-INVITE or UPDATE attacks) because they wouldn't be able to retrieve session parameters from the transiting SIP messages.
Point of change detection algorithms help for an early detection of flooding attacks, giving the operator some time for reaction. These algorithms can also be deployed to detect legitimate traffic overload problems.
12) Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
These systems can be classified into signature-based and anomaly-based. Signature-based systems specify rules to detect previously known challenges, e.g., SCUDIVE. On the other hand, anomaly-based IDPS use models and classifiers in order to learn and prevent new challenges, e.g., machine learning methods.
Several types of attacks can be detected or prevented using IDPS. We already mentioned the SIP SQL injection, flooding attacks and malformed messages. Many other types of threats can be found. SCIDIVE, for instance, is able to detect toll fraud attacks if a RTP session is still ongoing after tearing down the SIP session. However, most of the studied IDS focus on malformed messages detection. Few of them (e.g., SCIDIVE) correlate events to detect or prevent more complex problems.
13) User Privacy
User privacy is a serious issue in IMS, especially with the ability of application servers to share and modify user data. These application servers might belong to the operator or to third party players. It is therefore necessary to specify responsibilities and access privileges to user data in a legal way.
So far, the focus has been on end-to-end encryption techniques that protect user's identity and location from disclosure. These techniques are useful to reduce unsolicited communication problems. Identity protection also helps preventing threats where attackers need user's identity such as: session interruption, spoofing attacks and registration hijacking. They also guard against eavesdropping users' locations and identities.
14) Confidentiality and Integrity Protection
Several existing works have conducted comparative studies of the cryptographic algorithms mentioned above. In [63] , the authors study the security of SIP, SDP, MIKEY, SDES, ZRTP and SRTP. Results uncover potential attacks and flaws such as: replay attacks with SDES, man-in-the-middle attacks in ZRTP and weaknesses in MIKEY's key derivation process. Floroiu and Sisalem also analyze the security of SDES, MIKEY, ZRTP and DTLS [32] . A number of possible attacks with their mitigation techniques are stated. In [33] , the authors compare SDES, DTLS-SRTP, ZRTP and conclude that the three methods are suitable. Results show that each protocol adds certain features, but brings new vulnerabilities comparing to the others. No protocol can thus be considered as the best.
Confidentiality and integrity protection provides endto-end security to final users. Signaling protection prevents all challenges based on modification/eavesdropping of SIP messages, or session parameters, as discussed before. Media protection prevents problems such as eavesdropping, SQL injections and spoofing attacks. Topology hiding prevents P-CSCF bypassing problems and, partially, flooding attacks against IMS.
15) Virtualization
Studies of IMS virtualization are still very limited. However, this technology is promising in terms of challenge mitigation and recovery, especially with overload problems such as denial of service and legitimate traffic overload. Virtualization might also be efficient with incidents and large-scale disasters if the hardware does not fail before the time necessary for live migration.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
This paper presents an analysis of IMS resilience challenges and countermeasures.
We have first defined resilience attributes and objectives. The attributes are availability, confidentiality, integrity, and accountability, while the objectives comprise prevention, mitigation, and recovery.
We have classified IMS challenges using a twodimensional tree-based taxonomy. Dimensions consist of aim and location. Aim represents the impacted resilience attributes. We have thus categorized IMS challenges based on their aim into four classes: loss of availability, loss of confidentiality, loss of integrity, and loss of accountability. Each class is represented by an attack tree for which the top event is "Loss of X", X being a resilience attribute. For each class, we have developed the tree in a top-down manner by distributing the potential challenges according to their location. Location includes three components: segment, layer, and element. We have divided the IMS network into three segments: access segment, core network, and interworking zone between two IMS core networks belonging to different operators. In each segment, we distinguished the challenges that appear at the control and the application layer. Finally, for each layer, we identified exactly the impacted element.
We have determined eight classes of countermeasures. The benefits of each class have been studied. These countermeasures are: (i) redundancy; (ii) failure detection; (iii) authentication schemes along with signaling confidentiality and integrity methods; (iv) protection against DoS; (v) intrusion detection and prevention systems; (vi) user privacy protection; (vii) confidentiality and integrity protection; (viii) virtualization.
Finally, we have performed the mapping of countermeasures classes with challenge families.
In a future work, we will exploit these results to design the resilience of an IMS-based service named RCS-e [64] .
At the moment of writing, RCS-e is the only IMSbased service that offers both voice and data services.
RCS-e CCTs' building will be based on the results presented in this paper:
IMS challenge classifications trees -these trees will be finalized to offer more complete attack trees by: (i) eliminating impossible, or irrelevant, attack scenarios for RCS-e; (ii) adding specific challenges that come with RCS-e.
Mapping
between challenge families and countermeasure classes -it will be exploited to construct the countermeasure parts of RCS-e CCTs.
